Deflection came with a critical report on the 2004 Bill by the Parliamentary Scrutiny Committee chaired by Lord Carlile of Berriew, which began with a statement that the case for reform of the 1983 Act was not overwhelming, but made 127 recommendations which, broadly speaking, supported the approach taken by the Richardson Committee, and the Mental Health Alliance policies.
Meanwhile in Scotland there had been two Reports; the Millan Committee Report considering civil patients, and the Mclean Committee Report on provisions for defendants and offenders. The Millan Committee Report, which broadly agreed with the approach set out in the Richardson Committee Report, had led to Scottish mental health legislation, the Scottish Mental Health (Care and Treatment) Act 2003. The Scrutiny Committee was clearly impressed with that legislation which influenced their recommendations.
In the face of such widespread consensus over how to improve it, the government abandoned the 2004 Bill. Factors in this decision were the costs of the new Tribunal system; government's failure to undertake a Race Equality Impact Assessment on the Bill as required under the Race Relations Act, 2001 and the Bill's incomprehensible drafting. The Amendment Bill that followed in 2006 jettisoned some popular features of the 2004 Bill (most notably the new process for authorising compulsion through the new Tribunals and statutory care plans) and bolted government's central policies on to the 1983 Act. The holy grail of mental health law fit for a new century had vanished.
The ideological differences between government and lobbyists made this result inevitable. Home Office determination to detain 'dangerous people with personality disorder' coloured every contentious area. Certainly, with the complexity of the issues, agreement over less contentious issues was never going to be easy. However, had the Department of Health and the Home Office taken the stakeholders along with them in meaningful collaboration, some improvement may have been made. There are examples of collaboration on complex issues that have been productive -the work of the Disability Rights Task Force on substantial reform of the Disability Discrimination Act and the work on the Mental Capacity Act among them. As it was, positions became more entrenched as time went by, and policy making was too politicised. On the side of the stakeholders, policy proposals were developed without an understanding of the real nature of government's objections to them. Frustrated by the lack of dialogue, they remained locked into positions that were never likely to succeed. The government departments also seemed to be lodged in their separate bunkers. The many efforts at consultation were unproductive. It was only in parliament that a genuine dialogue occurred and glimpses of workable compromises could be seen. This was too late. The opportunity to benefit mental health patients, their families and those professionals who care for them was lost.
The remaining parts of this article will examine the issues that dominated the parliamentary process, and will consider their results.
Principles
The Richardson Committee and the Joint Scrutiny Committee both considered it vital for the law to be based on a statutory set of principles that would give greater clarity and certainty to the courts; guide practitioners concerned about how to exercise their powers; and reassure the public, patients and families that the values and principles set out in the Act should permeate how mental health services are provided. The professional organisations and the Black and Minority Ethnic Network were united in emphasising the symbolic importance of statutory principles in directing best practice and in helping to overcome stigma 15 .
Although there had been a set of principles for the 2004 Bill, there remained contention over what any such principles might state. The House of Lords sought, as a minimum core, respect for wishes and feelings, participation of patients in decisions, and non-discrimination with the least restrictive alternative applying in all circumstances. However, the government baulked at even such a minimalist list, arguing in part that it would be impossible to graft principles onto the 1983 Act, and that:
principles may not in fact be relevant to every situation or, may conflict with each other or with the specific provisions of the Act. What weight is the decision-maker to give to the different criteria in that case? Is there a potential for him to be challenged because he has, for example, not complied with the patient's wishes? 16 The result was a messy compromise. The Code shall include a statement of the principles which the Secretary of State thinks should inform decisions under this Act, and the following "matters shall be addressed": The 2007 Act further requires that the Secretary of State shall also have regard to the desirability of ensuring the efficient use of resources and the equitable distribution of services 18 . This was explained as being required for Wales, with its placement outside the principal list of matters to be addressed an acknowledgement that it was not of equal weight to them. In contrast to the House of Lords' core principles, the 2007 Act therefore gives a long list of factors of different levels of importance. Indeed, some of these are very important, and address matters not otherwise dealt with under the legislation. For instance, the references to wishes and feelings and to patient participation are vital given the fact that the patient may be treated without consent, and that the statute does not provide a duty to consult him or her, or, in most situations, take note of any advance directive. It will be interesting to see how the Code will word these principles, and whether, for instance, any of the robust language of the Richardson principles will find their way in to the Code. It is also possible that their usefulness will be further reduced by being expanded. needed for departing from the Code, but at least its recognition on the face of the statute may give it greater weight in practice. However, the real issue is how the courts will read the new provision. The significance from the point of view of statutory interpretation of having "matters" specified in the Act but the principles set out in the Code (rather than as at present simply in the Code) is not clear, and may present a challenge to an ingenious counsel. Will it be possible to use judicial review to challenge a decision on the ground that it was made without regard to a principle, or will these linguistic niceties preclude such an approach?
The definition of mental disorder
The gateway to the compulsory powers in the 1983 Act is the definition of mental disorder, which is circumscribed by a set of exclusions. The 2007 Act replaces this definition and the four classifications of mental illness, psychopathic disorder, mental impairment and severe mental impairment, with a wider general definition of mental disorder as "any disorder or disability of the mind", and it changes the exclusions.
Lord Rix and Angela Browning MP led an unsuccessful attempt to exclude people with learning disabilities and developmental disorders such as autism from Part II. The new Act extends compulsory powers to people with developmental disorders and those with learning disabilities in the same way as the unamended Act. This leaves some confusion and overlap with the Mental Capacity Act, which (when amended to cover the 'Bournewood' patients) will also cover people with learning disabilities who lack capacity; permitting the deprivation of their liberty, including the use of a proportionate degree of force if it is in their best interests. Psychiatry, 182, 105-116. Morgan C, Mallett R, Hutchinson G, Bagalkote H, Morgan K, Fearon P, Dazzan P, Boydell J, McKenzie K, Harrison G, Murray R, Jones P, Craig T and Leff J (2005) All these reasons persuaded the House of Lords to seek to insert into the Act a set of exclusions relating to disorders of sexual preference (with the exception of paedophilia) or gender identity; the commission, or likely commission, of illegal or disorderly acts; and cultural, religious or political beliefs 33 .
The government argued variously (and contrary to evidence from Victoria, New South Wales and New Zealand) that exclusions would be "arbitrary obstacles to the use of compulsion" 34 and could give rise to legal challenges, or that they were unnecessary and potentially counter-productive (in that excluding certain conditions from the definition might imply that, but for the exclusion, they would be mental disorders within the meaning of the Act) 35 .
Government finally agreed to add to the principles "respect for diversity generally including, in particular, diversity of religion, culture and sexual orientation (within the meaning of section 35 of the Equality Act 2006)":
This would be a declaratory statement about what mental health legislation should be in our society, now and that society should treat with decency and dignity people whose behaviour is different and, sometimes, difficult and challenging. 36
Baroness Barker, perhaps with detained terrorists in mind, regretted that the amendment did not expressly cover belief as well as religion: "we already have people detained under mental health legislation, at least in part because of their beliefs" 37 . Given that freedom of belief is included with freedom of religion in Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights 38 , there is not quite the lack of protection that she feared. The initial draft Code of Practice stated that: 
Capacity
The debate over the place of capacity in a future mental health law was launched by the Richardson Committee but was given impetus by the passing of the Mental Capacity Act in 2005. The Committee founded its approach on patient autonomy. While acknowledging that exceptions might be made for a person who was dangerous to others or suicidal, they recommended that compulsory powers should be largely confined to those who lack capacity to make their own decisions
The most committed proponents of a law based on capacity were an unexpected trio of the Royal College of Psychiatrists, the British Psychological Society and Mind. They pointed to the persistence of discrimination against people with mental health problems and its blight on peoples' lives 41 . They highlighted the link between stigma and poor health, patient choice and the better health outcomes which NICE Guidelines 42 and NHS policies 43 proclaim. In their view, fairness to service users and patients demanded that the issue of forcing treatment on mentally capable patients be addressed. Heginbotham C and Kinton M (2007) 'Developing a capacity test for compulsion in mental health law ' JMHL 15; [72] [73] [74] [75] [76] [77] [78] [79] [80] [81] [82] [83] [84] is a feature of other laws 47 , and research evidence shows the reliability of capacity tests 48 . Nevertheless, the proponents of the test did not make a consistent case either.
The debate in both Houses of Parliament on this issue was impassioned and sustained, with advocates for a capacity threshold from all political parties. The government refusal to negotiate for a test was framed as a concern not to stand in the way of treating a suicidal patient, but the underlying fear was how it would apply to patients with personality disorder, and the underlying assumption the government's extraordinary paternalistic position (in the context of a debate over the appropriate scope of mental health compulsion) that "every restriction was a patient not treated" 49 :
if it cannot be shown that a patient's judgment is impaired, they cannot be detained -regardless of how much the patient needs treatment and however much they, and others, are at risk without it. 50 The impassioned response by Earl Howe summed up the differences between the positions of government and those calling for a threshold of impaired decision-making: As the English Bill was in Parliament, the Bamford Committee recommended capacity-based legislation in their report on reforming the mental health law in Northern Ireland, so that the treatment of people who lack capacity for both physical and mental illness should proceed under the same principles 52 . The Joint Committee on Human Rights has argued that there is a rational and objective justification, in relation to decisions about treatment, for treating differently a person suffering from a condition which seriously impairs his or her mental capacity to choose whether to accept treatment, from someone whose mental capacity for decision-making is not so seriously impaired 53 . The existing 'treatability test' is a weak test, applied to certain patients at certain times, which sets a threshold only that a patient is likely to respond to a very broad range of interventions. Nevertheless, government argued that it was used to exclude from services people whose personality disorder is deemed to be 'untreatable'. Their opponents held that this was no longer the case, given the more widespread availability of psychological treatments for personality disorder (whose prominence is likely to increase under the new Act, since psychologists would become responsible clinicians in charge of treatment). Training and the development of services will help to deliver a new generation of practitioners who are versed in the new approaches to treatment. Professor Appleby, the National Director of Mental Health has recently acknowledged the improvements for people with a personality disorder 61 .
The Bill replaced the treatability test with a loosely worded test of "appropriate treatment" which is "available" to the patient 62 . These terms significantly broaden the scope of the law. If treatment must be simply "available" to a person, the test will be satisfied whether or not s/he agrees to be treated or is willing or able to engage with or benefit from treatment. must be "appropriate in [the patient's] case, taking into account the nature and degree of the mental disorder from which he is suffering and all other circumstances of his case" was much more than the treatability test currently requires, as the medical treatment must be appropriate to the patient "as an individual" 63 , but others fear that "all the circumstances of the case" will permit issues of public protection to override therapeutic benefit.
With government facing a torrent of criticism in parliament, a compromise amendment was passed to require that the "purpose" of medical treatment must be to "alleviate the mental disorder or one or more of its symptoms or manifestations". Chris Bryant, Member of Parliament for Rhondda, who moved the amendment, was clear that "purpose" was a robust test. It avoided the concept of "likelihood" implied in the current legislation, and stated in previous amendments proposed by the opposition, which was deemed too high a threshold and inappropriately based upon prediction. Nevertheless, a treatment could not have the necessary purpose unless the clinician could show that there was some likelihood it would succeed, and this should be evidence-based rather than subjective.
For behaviour to be a "manifestation" of a disorder, it must be the direct result of it. The term has the same meaning as the clinical term "signs" 64 . It follows that a person with a mental disorder may not be detained because of their violent behaviour if it arises from other sources than the disorder itself, however difficult that distinction may be in practice. How the test will be applied (perhaps especially to people with learning difficulties) remains to be seen. However, the existing treatability test has been interpreted to allow that the required treatment for restricted patients may be no more than containment within a therapeutic environment under the supervision of health professionals, with only minimal benefit to the patient 65 . If this is extended to all paients the new legislative wording will make little difference to practice.
Community treatment orders (CTOs) 66
The introduction of community treatment orders is the most substantial change to the regime for compulsory treatment under the 1983 Act and it remains a controversial innovation. Significantly, it was opposed entirely by Mind 67 and by all service user groups .
Critics claim that, by removing the limiting pressure of bed spaces, CTOs will inevitably lead to more patients being subject to compulsory powers, will increase the use of or reliance upon medication in the treatment of illness (given that the power is designed to impose medication compliance); and will disproportionately impact on people from Black and minority ethnic backgrounds. They fear that the community services are not sufficiently well resourced or well developed to ensure the delivery of safe and effective care 68 . Government, for its part, favours CTOs for a range of reasons -that they are more flexible; more consistent with community-based modern service delivery; less traumatic for patients than long hospital stays; and, above all, that they will address the problem of revolving door patients. After the outcry surrounding the 2004 Bill, the government decided to limit CTOs to any person who has been placed on a treatment order (if only for a short time) as a civil or a Part III patient.
The Mental Health Alliance criticised the Department of Health for proceeding to legislate having neither analysed the different models of community treatment in force in other jurisdictions nor assessed overseas experience of such models. Although the Department of Health did commission research from the Institute of Psychiatry, it did so too late to influence the policy making process. The Institute's report 69 , which was released the day after the Bill had completed its process through the House of Lords, is the most comprehensive review that has yet been undertaken of the existing international research literature on CTOs relating to civil patients over 52 jurisdictions in Australia, New Zealand, Canada, USA, Scotland and Israel. It reviewed 72 studies from six countries and concluded that there is no robust evidence that CTOs cause either reduction or increase in a range of outcomes, including hospital admissions; hospital bed days; compliance with treatment; violence; symptoms; offences resulting in arrest; social functioning; quality of life, care or satisfaction; and perceived coercion.
The 2007 Act provides that a person may be discharged from hospital on a CTO with the agreement of the responsible clinician and the approved mental health professional that the conditions are met. As the British Association of Social Workers pointed out, there is a lack of external oversight in this procedure. They will be close colleagues in the same clinical team, with no requirement to bring in a professional from outside the team as is the case with admissions to hospital 70 .
The conditions are very broad. If the patient has a mental disorder which makes it "appropriate for him to receive medical treatment" the responsible clinician must decide whether it is "necessary for his health or safety or for the protection of others that he should receive such treatment", the treatment can be provided without his continuing to be detained in hospital and "it is necessary that the responsible clinician should be able to exercise the power to recall the patient to hospital" 71 .
The House of Lords argued for limits to be placed on CTOs. As Lord Patel expressed it:
If Parliament drafts the law too widely, the danger is that CTOs will be applied too widely. Another fear was that patients would remain on CTOs indefinitely. Given the broad criteria, Tribunals would find it difficult to justify the discharge a patient if the responsible clinician and approved mental health professional decided otherwise. The patient's right to apply to the Tribunal to challenge a CTO, or its renewal, would be of little value. The Government's stated goal was identified to Parliament by Lord Warner as: the continuing number of revolving door patients…who leave hospital, disengage from mental health services, do not continue with their treatment, [until] their health deteriorates and they end up compulsorily detained in hospital. We may have differences in view about the numbers involved, but that is the cycle we are trying to deal with. 73 Their argument for community treatment orders also focused on cases where a person poses a serious risk to others. This was in part as a result of the work of forensic psychiatrists such as Professor Tony Maden 74 .
The House of Lords amendments, which would have limited the scope of CTOs to such "revolving door" patients, were ultimately overturned, However Lord Hunt emphasised that the clinician must be "satisfied of the patient's previous history of non engagement and non-compliance that made it unsafe to treat the patient in the community voluntarily" 75 . In a small acknowledgement of the issue, the government agreed to an amendment that would amplify why it was necessary for a clinician to have a power of recall. The Act now provides that:
in determining whether the criterion in subsection (5) (d) above is met, the responsible clinician shall, in particular, consider, having regard to the patient's history of mental disorder and any other relevant factors, what risk there would be of a deterioration of the patient's condition if he were not detained in a hospital (as a result, for example, of his refusing or neglecting to receive the medical treatment he requires for his mental disorder). 76
The Minister stated that:
this has the effect that the responsible clinician must consider the risk of the patient's condition deteriorating in the community when deciding whether it is necessary for him to be able to exercise the power to recall the patient to hospital. This means that, in order to place a patient on supervised community treatment, the responsible clinician will need to be able to show that he has properly considered and, if appropriate, assessed the risk of deterioration-otherwise, his decision could be open to challenge in the courts. 77 The failure to get any significant changes to the thresholds for CTOs leave the anxieties expressed above undiminished. It should be noted that if one takes account of all the eligibility criteria for a person being placed on a CTO, including the definition of mental disorder that is the initial gateway, then the powers provided in this Act, are in excess of those provided in the mental health laws in Scotland, Ireland, Australia, New Zealand, and in those parts of Canada and USA with community treatment regimes 78 . The CTO regime in USA is particularly narrow. In most US jurisdictions the use of compulsory powers has been greatly restricted on civil rights grounds and is confined to people with a mental illness who are at imminent danger to themselves or others 79 . In many cases there is no enforcement mechanism 80 , and so they are comparable in many respects to supervised discharge rather than to CTO.
Several other features of the CTO regime are worth noting. There is no requirement in the Act to discuss the making of an order with the patient or with the nearest relative, even though their participation is essential. The conditions placed upon the patient may be varied by the responsible clinician only with the agreement of the approved mental health professional. The Bill originally specified the types of conditions that could be placed on the orders, which included specifying a place of residence and rules about the patient's conduct. In response to the Joint Committee on Human Rights' concerns that these conditions were unduly intrusive and could breach Article 8 rights to private and family life and home, 81 the government amended the Bill, removing all references specifying the permissible subject of orders, but limiting them to measures necessary to ensure a patient receives medical treatment; to prevent risk of harm to the patient's health or safety; or to protect others 82 .
A patient has no right to challenge a condition placed on a CTO and, even on an application for discharge, the Tribunal has no power to vary conditions. An amendment to provide for a right of appeal against the conditions was defeated, with the government maintaining that conditions that were not agreed by patients would not be appropriate. However the experience in the Australian state of Victoria for instance, where a condition of residence is permitted, is that such appeals are not rare 83 .
The Royal College of Psychiatrists 84 and the Chair of the Mental Health Act Commission 85 were alarmed by provisions for the involvement of a second opinion approved doctor (SOAD) embedded in the almost incomprehensible Part IVA of the 2007 Act. The treatment of any CTO patient (including those who consent to treatment) will, after a month, have to be authorised by a second opinion appointed doctor (SOAD). The SOAD is empowered to authorise such treatment as may be imposed should the patient be recalled to hospital, and, extraordinarily, also to authorise treatment that would be imposed should a consenting patient withdraw consent or lose capacity. This changes an essential component of the SOAD role which, as the current Code of Practice stipulates 86 , is to examine the patient and make a judgment in the light of the patient's changed circumstances. Session 2006 -7, 4th Report p. 20-22. 82 MHA 1983 The fact that a SOAD who certifies that a community patient consents to treatment will also certify what treatments can be imposed on the patient if he or she withdraws consent and is recalled to hospital, underlines the coercive nature of the CTO regime and surely breaches the principle underlying true consent that "permission given under any unfair or undue pressure is not 'consent'" 88 .
The differences between the SOADs' role for detained and community patients is not based on clinical considerations or patients' welfare, but a technical problem of the difficulty in ensuring that a SOAD can be called quickly enough (within 72 hours) if a community patient is recalled to hospital. Other solutions could have been found to this problem, including the use of emergency powers under section 62.
Roles of clinicians
The 2007 Act provides for the role of the responsible medical officer to be replaced with that of the responsible clinician, to be defined in regulations. It is anticipated that chartered psychologists, nurses, social workers and occupational psychologists will be included. They will need to satisfy specified competencies. Stakeholders have welcomed this workforce reform.
The government accepted the opposition argument that Section 20 of the 1983 Act needed amending. It was anomalous for a patient to have his/her detention renewed on the recommendation of one clinician, when it required two opinions for the original order. From a clinical point of view, it is likely to require a higher level of expertise to diagnose an illness once the person's condition has stabilised than when he or she is in a state of mental crisis and the disordered state of mind is only too evident. From an ethical point of view, a person's liberty should not be denied on the basis of one opinion.
In the case of the renewal of detention, the amended Act will require that a person who has been "professionally concerned with the patient's medical treatment; but who belongs to a profession other than that to which the responsible clinician belongs", must state "in writing that he agrees that the conditions are satisfied" before a section can be renewed 89 . This does not expressly require the patient to be examined by the second professional, and in that respect it is a weaker safeguard than that to be provided for patients deprived of liberty under the amended Mental Capacity Act 90 . Given that the two clinicians will come from the same team, and that the status of the clinician giving the second opinion is not specified, it also fails to provide the robust safeguard the opposition amendments had sought.
It is not clear that the new arrangements satisfy the requirements of Article 5 of the European Convention. Under the 2007 Act, the initial s.3 detention for six months is still based on the opinions of two medical practitioners. Thereafter (where the responsible clinician is not a doctor), all periods of detention can be authorised by non-medical practitioners. This potentially removes from the process the "objective medical expertise of a kind or degree warranting compulsory confinement" (the test from Winterwerp v the Netherlands), which is required for a valid detention under ECHR Article 5. The Joint Committee on Human Rights have cited ECHR jurisprudence to the effect only a person with medical The courts and Code of Practice will be relied upon for guidance with this issue.
The right to advocacy, although not directly enforceable, is a huge gain for patients if the resources that have been promised are made available 98 . There are significant gains for children and young people. Age appropriate facilities will in time be required for all patients under 18 years 99 . The capacitous refusal of 16-and 17-year-olds to hospital admission will not be overridden by parental authority 100 , a second opinion appointed doctor will need to agree for ECT to be administered to any detained patient under 18-years-old 101 , and there will be an annual referral to the Mental Health Review Tribunal for patients under 18 years old who do not request a hearing 102 . There will be no ECT in the face of capacitous refusal of any patient, other than in an emergency, and emergency ECT will only be permitted if immediately necessary to save life or immediately necessary to prevent a serious deterioration in his condition 103 .
Lost opportunities
There is no doubt that the 2007 Bill was improved in its course through Parliament. The extremes of the government's zeal that nothing should stand in the way of clinical discretion were tempered and patient safeguards were improved. Nevertheless, it remains simply an amending Bill and, as such, a valuable opportunity lost. No government is likely to re-enter the minefield of mental health law reform in a hurry. Progressive reforms including, above all, the recognition of statutory care plans and advance directives, and a right to assessment of mental health needs, were all in the Richardson Committee framework and were all supported with enthusiasm in Parliament, but were all dismissed summarily by the government. MHA 1983 s68(6) as amended by MHA 2007 s37. 103 MHA 1983 s58A as amended by MHA 2007 
